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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MONNA McBROOM,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 9702

HOWARD KIRTLEY
M·cBROOM,
Defendant and Respondent.
Defendant's Answering· Brief to Plaintiff's Brief
on Plaintiff's Appeal from the Order of the
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Third District
Court for Salt Lake County, Utah
STATEMENT OF FACTS
vVe do not ag·ree with plaintiff, Monna McBroom's, statement of flacts set forth in plaintiff's
brief with respect to the appeal by plaintiff from
the order entered by Judge Marcellus K. Snow on
the 19th day of July, 1962.
The trial court entered its findings of fact
and decree of divorce, from vvhich defendant, Howard
Kirtley :rvicBroon1, is appealing to this court, on
~-\.pril 23, 1962. (R. 38-44.) On June 25, 1962, de1
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fendant was forced to move the trial court for an
order, pending this appeal, fixing defendant's rights
of visitation, restraining plaintiff from punishing
the children for visiting their father, restraining
plaintiff from attempting to degrade their father
in the minds of the children and from 1attempting
to alienate the children, and restraining plaintiff
from removing the children from the State of Utah,
•
(R. 92-97) because plaintiff had repeatedly and
persistently denied defendant rights of visitation
of the children, punished the children for visiting
defendant, used the children ~and refused defendant
his rights of visitation in attempts to extort money
from defendant, threatened to remove the children
from the State of Utah if the defendant continued
to prosecute this appeal and a suit against Bertram
James J1a.rvis for criminal conversation with plaintiff, and plaintiff had continued to visit neglect
and moral depravity upon the children since the
trial. (R. 95-97.) Plaintiff filed a counter-petition
in which plaintiff agreed to submit the matter of
visitation to the court ( R. 98) , and sought to hold
defendant in contempt on ~a false claim that defendant was behind one month in payment of support money, and to restrain defendant from coming on the premises of the home of the parties at
583 Cortez Street except to exercise his rights of
visitation of the minor children. ( R. 98-101.) A
2
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hearing was had on this matter on July 9 and July
11, 1962. (R. 582-674.) The trial court, Judge M1arcellus K. Snow presiding, found all of the issues in
favor of defendant (R. 78-81), and on July 19, 1962,
entered an order granting defendant rights of visitation and issued restraining orders to guarantee
enforcement, and thereupon awarded pl,aintiff a
judgment against defendant in the sum of $125.00
for attorneys fees in connection with this hearing.
(R. 82-84.) Plaintiff thereupon proceeded to violate
the court's order (R. 114-115, 117-122, 675-691),
and defendant was again required to bring plaintiff into ·court on contempt ch1arges (R. 114-115)
before Judge A. H. Ellett on the 27th day of July,
1962, (R. 675-691) in order to procure enforcement of the order. (R. 675-691, 127-129.)
Plaintiff appeals to this court from the order
of Judge Snow, and defendant cross-appeals from
that part of the order awarding plaintiff the additional $125.00 attorneys fees. The parties stipulated in this court that defendant's appeal from the
decree of divorce and plaintiff's appeal from the
order of Judge Snow entered on July 19, 1962,
may be consolidated for purposes of hearing in
this court.
The evidence at the hearing before Judge Snow
was as follows.
Under the decree of divorce entered on April
3
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23, 1962, the trial court erroneously granted custody
of the minor children to plaintiff. The court did,
however, grant defendant the right of reasonable
visitation. ( R. 38-44.)

Between the time of trial of the divorce action
on March 13, 1962, and the date of the hearing before Judge Snow on July 9, 1962, plaintiff continu'ally refused to permit defendant to visit the children
except on certain Sunday afternoons between the
hours of 12:00 o'clock Noon and 7:30 o'clock P.M.
On those occasions defendant never knew whether
he would have the cildren or not because, when he
requested visitation, plaintiff would answer equivocally and say, "you come by on Sunday at noon."
(R. 588, 597, 611.)
During the five month period between the time
that defendant moved out of the home of the parties
on January 31, 1962, (R. 11-12, 198, 477) and the
date of the hearing before Judge Snow, plaintiff
only permitted defendant to have the children with
him overnight on one occasion, to-wit, on May 25,
1962, although defendant had continually requested
that plaintiff permit him to have the children with
him overnight. ( R. 585-588, 598.)
During the period subsequent to the trial of
this action plaintiff has used the children and refused defendant his rights of visitation in efforts
to extort n1oney from defendan!t. ( R. 588-592.)
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On Saturday, March 24, 1962, plaintiff told defendant that he could not visit with the children on the
following Sunday afternoon unless the defendant
paid her $25.00 so that she could pay a water bill.
Defendant had previously on two occasions given
her money to pay this bill. Defendant replied to the
plaintiff, "I am not going to buy my children.''
Plaintiff said, "Then you won't see them." Defendant pointed out to plaintiff that she was using the
children and that it was not good for them, and
plaintiff replied that it was not good for him either.
(R. 588-589.) On the following day, Sunday, March
25, 1962, plaintiff had the little girl, age 6, and the
little boy, age 8, call the defendant on the telephone
and tell him that the plaintiff said he could have
them that aiternoon if he would pay the plaintiff
$25.00. Plaintiff broke in on the conversation and
told the little gir I to tell her father to bring the
money in cash. The little gir I was crying and the
little boy was very upset. They pleaded with their
father to pay $25.00 in cash to the plaintiff so that
they could be with him for an afternoon. The defendant explained to the children that it would not be
right for hi1n to pay money in order to see his children. The plaintiff, n1other, then broke in on the
conversation again a11d said to the children concerning their father, "The son-of-a-bitch wants the water
turned off and he wants to hurt tls all that he pes1

~)
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sibly can." (R. 589-59'2.) Plaintiff on the witness
stand in the hearing before Judge Snow admitted
that she refused to let defen,dant have the children
on this occasion because he would not pay her the
money that she demanded. She did not deny the
cruelty 1a.nd moral depravity visited on the children
on this occasion. ( R. 628.) On another occasion
plaintiff demanded that defendant pay her $200.00.
Defendant replied that he was mailing the $200.00
to the clerk of the district court that day. Plaintiff
then said, "If it isn't in there when I say it is going
to be in there, then you won't see the children."
(R. 59'3.)
Plaintiff used the children, and denied defendant his rights of visitation, and threatened to remove the children from the State of Utah and never
permit defendant to see the children again, if defendant continued to prosecute his appeal to this
court from the decree of divorce entered by Judge
Jeppson in this action. She also Yisited the same
misconduct and cruelty upon the children and n1ade
the same threats if defendant continued to prosecute an 'action for criminal conversation against
Bert Jarvis in connection vvith his and plaintiff's
adulterous activities. Just prior to Memorial Day,
May 28, 1962, defendant called plaintiff and requested visitation of the children over the holiday.
Plaintiff then asked defendant if he was going to
6
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continue the adultery suit against Bert Jarvis and
whether defendant was going to appeal to this court
from the decree of divorce. Defendant replied that
he was. Plaintiff thereupon refused to grant defendant permission to see the children over Memorial
Day and refused to permit him to visit the children
for three weeks thereafter. ( R. 592-593, 614.) In
the same conversation plaintiff told defendant that,
if he continued with the lawsuit against Jarvis or
with ·his appeal, she would take the children out of
the state and he would never see them ·again. She 'also
said that, when she got through with the children,
they would never speak to their father. (R. 593.)
Since the trial of the divorce action plaintiff
has beaten and punished the children for visiting
'\Vith their father during periods when she was not
permitting them to see their father at all. On one
occasion defendant picked up the children after
school and notified the plaintiff that he would return them to the home between 6:30 and 7:00
o'clock P.M. When the defendant took the children
home, plaintiff slapped the little boy in the face
and hit the little girl and caused her to fall down
on the floor. ( R. 605.) On another occasion defendant found his little boy riding his bicycle on the
State Capitol grounds. When defendant approached
the little boy, the little boy was terrified. His father
told the little boy that he only wanted to talk to the
7
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little boy for a few minutes. The little boy replied
that he was afraid because he would get beaten by
the plaintiff if he got in the defendant's car. The
defendant suggested that they go call the plaintiff
on the telephone and ask if they could play for twenty
or thirty minutes. T'hey did so. In the conversation
the plaintiff said to the little boy, "If you're not
home in five minutes I'm going to hit you six times
with a stick instead of five." Thereafter the defendant let his little boy go home. ( R. 604-605.) Defendant pointed out to plaintiff the damage she was
doing to the children by punishing t'hem for associating with him. Plaintiff in the conversation admitted that she punished the children for associating with their father. (R. 606.) Plaintiff also admitted on cross-examination that she punished the
!children for associatin·g with their father. (R. 645646.) The defendant testified as to the effect on the
children of this conduct of the plaintiff. A week
before the hearing before Judge Snow defendant
went to see the children at a baby tenders. The little
boy said, "What do you want, what do you want?
I don't want to see you.'' The boy then explained
that he did not want to see his father because he
would get hurt by the plaintiff. ( R. 606.)
Plaintiff has repeatedly since the trial of this
action attempted to poison the minds of the children
against their father and to alienate their affection
8
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for him. She told the defendant that, when she got
through with the 'children, they would never speak
to him again. ( R. 593, 606.) She berated the little
girl to the point of tears because the little girl only
gave her a homemade Mother's Day card and no
other present on Mother's Day and then said to the
little girl, "It's your father's fault and your fault.
And you remember all those other little ~children
that brought presents for their mother, but not
you." When defendant confronted plaintiff with
this incident, she replied, "So what." (R. 603.) She
referred to 'the defendant as a son-of-a-bitch and
told the children that he wanted to hurt them all
he could. (R. 591.) Plaintiff testified as a conclusion over objection tha:t she never degraded the defendant in the eyes of the children. (R. 6'27-628,
Plaintiff's brief on appeal from the order of Judge
Snow, (p. 9.) In the Iface of the uncontroverted facts,
plaintiff's notions as Ito what is degrading do not
conform to ordinary standards.
The eviden'ce at the hearing before Judge Snow
was that, subsequent to the trial of this action, the
children were left at the homes of baby tenders all
day while the plaintiff was working and even for
extended periods when she was not working, rather
than in the care of the defendant and their blood
relatives. (R. 650, 610, 599.) Defendant at the hearing offered to care for the children at all times, with
9
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his mother, Mrs. R. A. McBroom, and other competent help, when plaintiff was unable to care for
them. (R. 619.) Plaintiff on the witness stand admitted, !as she had done at the trial before Judge
Jeppson ( R. 205, 234-235, 250, 273), that the defendant was a good father. (R. 653-654.) On crossexamination she refused his offer to care for the
children when she was unable to do so. She gave as
her reason that it was dam'aging to the children
even though he was a good father. When pressed for
an explanation as to why it was damaging, she
replied that it was bad for the children because he
gave them presents, such as a race bug for his little
boy and he spent $41.00 on an outing for the children
on one Sunday. ('R. 649-6'50, 654.) For extended
periods plaintiff hid the 'children from their father
in the home of a strange baby tender. (R. 599.)
Defendant was required to Shadow her in order to
learn of their whereabouts so that he could be advised
as to their care and welfare. ( R. 599.) On the
little boy's birthday, June 8th, plaintiff refused to
permit the children to be with their father and instead left them ·all d~ay at a baby tender's home.
(R. 598-600, 631-632.) The defen:dant went anyway
and visited his little boy at \the baby tenders for
two hours on his birthday. (R. 599-600.) On the
witness stand the plaintiff admitted that she refused
to permit the children to see their father on the
1

10
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following Sunday because he ha,d gone and seen the
little boy at the baby tender's on his birthday. (R.
();)1-632.) On Saturday, June 9, plaintiff refused to
permit the children to go fishing with their fa:ther.
Instead she sent the little boy fishing with a strange
neighbor, whom the defendant had only seen on one
occasion. ·( R. 600, 631-632.) On certain occasions
subsequent to the trial of this action the children
have been left alone and comple tely unattended. On
one occasion defendant called the home of a baby
tender where he knew the children to be staying. The
little girl answered the telep·hone. s~he was crying
and afraid because there was no one in the horne
except an infant child of the baby tender. The defendant theretlpon went to the baby tender's home
and cared for the child. (R. 611-612.) The children
on one occasion contracted measles. The plaintiff
refused to permit the children to stay with their
father and instead left them during this period in
the home of a baby tender. (R. 630.) On another
occasion defen;dant went to the home of a baby tender
and found the little girl running the streets alone
in the neighborhood be'cause the baby tender was
not at the home. ( R. 611-612.)
1

Since the trial of the divorce action plaintiff
has continued to use obscene language and visit
moral depravity upon the children. Specifically she
and her mother taught the little girl, age 6, and the
11
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little boy, !age 8, two filthy jokes, one that had as
the punch line, "Bitch, Bitch, Bitch," and another
t'hat ended with, "Jesus Christ shit his pants." (R.
613-614.) We regret the necessity of printing this
material. However, the urgency of the situation with
referen·ce to the children before this court compels
us to do so. This type of profanity is not the result
of bitterness arising from a divorce action. It is
the deliberate visitation of immorality upon children.
On direct examination by her own counsel
plaintiff testified that she had never told the children any dirty jokes. ( R. 37.) On cross-examination
by defendant's counsel plaintiff reiterated the denial. (R. 63'9.) S'he was thereupon asked, as she
had been asked at the trial of the divorce action,
whether or not she had ever engaged in a conversation with defendant and the children in which she
said, "Play with your teats, Howard. Are they growing. Look, Lisa, he is rubbing his teats." Twice under oath at the hearing before Judge Snow she
categorically denied, as she had done at the trial
before Judge Jeppson ( R. 254), that any such conversation ever occurred. ( R. 639-641.) She then
stated under oath, as she had done at the trial before Judge Jeppson (R. 255-261), that she did not
want the recording of this conversation played for
the court. ( R. 644.) Thereafter the hearing before
Judge Snow was adjot1rned. (R. 665-666.) Plain12
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tiff had again committed perjury with reference
to her direct visitation of moral depravity upon the
children. (See defendant's brief on appeal from the
decree of divorce, pp. 23-24.) On the following day,
July 10, 1962, plaintiff and her counsel found it
necessary to move the court to re-open the hearing
before Judge 'Snow to correct her perjure:d testimony. The court ordered the hearing reopened for
the limited purpose of taking plaintiff's testimony
with reference to this matter. (R. 110-111.) On
July 11, 1962, plaintiff again appeared before Judge
Snow ~and admitted that the conversation had occurred between herself, the two children and Mr.
McBroom and that Exhibit 17 was a true and correct transcript of the conversation. (Ex. 17, R. 667668.) It is again apparent that plaintiff is the type
of woma.n that can come into court with a straight
face and deny her insidious conduct with reference
to the children; but, when confronted with specific
proof, she is forced to admit the depravity visited
upon them.
At the hearing before Judge Snow and on this
appeal from Judge Snow's order plaintiff has asserted as an excuse for prohibiting the children from
being with their father over week-ends and, in particular, on Sunday mornings, that she wanted to
take the children to the L.D.S. Church herself on
Sunday mornings. (R. 627, Plaintiff's brief on ap13
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peal from the order of Judge Snow, p. 12.) The uncontroverted evidence at the trial of the divorce action before Judge Jeppson was that defendant always took the children to the Presbyterian Church,
pursuant to an agreement of the parties that the
children would be raised in the Presbyterian Church,
and that defendant attended church with the1n !and
plaintiff did not except on rare occasions. (R. 482484, 564, 607-609.) At the trial plaintiff was forced
to admit that on one occasion she was consorting
on Sunday morning with a married man in an
apartment on the west side of Salt Lake City while
'her children were attending church with her husband. (R. 303.) The fact that the plaintiff and her
attorney are raising a religious issue before this
court is, in the light of pl,aintiff's conduct and standards of immorality, fantastic. At the hearing before Judge Snow on cross examination plaintiff
admitted that she had not attended the L.D.S.
Church with the children every Sunday since the
trial of the 'action and, when pressed on the issue,
she admitted that she did not even know what Sunday school class she was in or the name of the
teacher of the class. ( R. 653.)
Plaintiff asserted at the hearing before Judge
Snow !a,nd now asserts in her appeal from the order
of Judge Snow that she has been entirely reasonable
in permitting defendant to visit the children since
14
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the trial of the divorce action. In support of this
assertion, plaintiff testified in detail at the hearing,
and set out in plaintiff's brief on !appeal from the
order of Judge Snow in detail, the times when defendant had visited the children since the trial of
the divorce action. (R. 628-632, Plaintiff's brief
on appeal from the order of Judge Snow, pp. 4-5.)
From this, plaintiff argues in the brief that, "the
plaintiff's testimony in detail is set forth in the
statement of facts showing the times and places
when defendant had taken the children prior to the
hearing before Judge Snow, ~and base,d thereon, certainly defendant could h~ave no reasonable grounds
upon which to complain that he was being denied
visitation." (Plaintiff's brief on appeal from the
order of Judge Snow, p. 11.) This is a deliberate
and dishonest attempt on the p·art of the plaintiff
to mislead this court. The uncontroverted facts are
that, when defendant has visited the children subsequent to the trial, defendant has been forced to
do so over the protest and wifuout the consent of
plaintiff under circumstances in whi'ch plaintiff was
using the children in an effort to extort money from
the defendant, punishing them and visiting cruelty
upon them for seeing their father, and visiting imInorality and neglect upon them. (R. 614, 585-588,
598, 611, 589-592, 628, 593, 592-593, 614, 645-646.)
The evidence at the hearing before Judge Snow
15
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was that defendant had not touche'd the plaintiff
since prior to the divorce action ( R. 616), that
defenaant had never threatened to beat plaintiff
( R. 620), and that defendant had not gone on the
premises of the parties since the divorce action
except for the purpose of carrying the children up
to the door ~and leaving them after visitation (R. 614616), and there was no evidence that defendant had
harrassed plaintiff while at work.
The hearing before Judge Snow was held on
July 9, 1962. Defendant was not in default, much
less in contempt of court, for failure to pay support money. (Ex. D-A1, R. 621-623.)
Judge Marcellus K. Snow found all of the issues in favor of defendant (R. 78-81), and on July
19, 1962, entered an order granting defend'ant rights
of visitation and issued restraining orders to guarantee enforcement. (R. 82-84.) Specifically Judge
Snow found the following. ( 1) That since the trial
of the divorce action plaintiff had repeatedly and
persistently denied defenda.nt his rights of visitation of his minor children and plaintiff had used
the children and refused defendant his right of visitation for the purpose of attempting to force defendant to pay money to plaintiff. (2) That plaintiff since the trial of the divorce action had repeatedly attempted to alienate the affections of the
children for defendant and attempted to degrade
16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

defendant in the minds of the children. (3) That
plaintiff had threatened to remove the children from
the State of Utah and never permit defendant to see
his children again. ( 4) That defendant had paid
plaintiff all sums of money due and owing for support under the decree of divorce and that defendant
was current in his payments of support money and
not in contempt of the court in connection therewith.
( 5) 'That defendant had not, since the trial of the
divorce action, gone on the premises at '583 Cortez
Street except for the purpose of delivering the
children to the doorstep of the home after visiting
with the children and that defendant had not abused
or molested the plaintiff. ( R. 78-81.) Judge Snow
thereupon entered an order fixing the times of
visitation and restraining plaintiff from using the
children and denying defendant rights of visitation
for the purpose of attempting to force defendant
to pay money to plaintiff and restraining plaintiff
from taking the children out of the State of U'tah
for a period in excess of 30 days without express
permission of the court, first ·had and obtained,
on notice to defendant and a hearing thereon. Judge
Snow further ordered plaintiff to disclose to defendant the location of any home in which the children might be staying and the telephone number of
such home. He turther provided in his order that
defendant was current in his payments of support
17
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money and tha:t the next payment was to be made
during the month of July, 1962. He thereupon
awarded plaintiff a judgment against defendant in
the sum of $125.00 for attorney fees in connection
with this hearing. (R. 82-84.)
Defendant testified at the hearing before Judge
Snow that, when plaintiff denied him the right to
visit ·his little boy on his birthday, 'he told plain tiff
he was going to ~apply to the court to define what
reasonable visitation was; and, that plaintiff replied, "I don't care what the court says. I am going
to do as I please." (R. 598-599.) Plaintiff's attorney
~asked plaintiff at the hearing before Judge Snow
whether she ever told defendant that she would not
live up to the order of fue court. Plaintiff replied
that She, "never, never did." ( R. 638.) She thereupon proceeded to violate the order of Judge Snow
(R. 114-115, 117-122, 675-691) and defendant was
again forced to bring plaintiff into court on contempt charges (R. 114-115) before Judge A. H.
Ellett on the 27th day of July, 1962, (R. 675-691)
in order to procure enforcement of Judge Snow's
order. (R. 675-691, 127-129.) Judge Ellett ordered
plaintiff to comply with the order of Judge Snow
and required her to make up for her previous violations. (R. 127-129.)
18
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ER'R IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF A JUDGMENT FOR
$200.00 DELINQUENT SUPPORT MONEY.

Plaintiff, in her counterpetition before Judge
Snow, claimed that defendant was behind one month
in payment of support money as of the date of the
hearing on July 9, 196'2, and sought to hold defendant in contempt of court ·by reason of the alleged
delinquency !and sought a judgment against defendant for $200.00 delinquent support money. The
decree of divorce was entered on the 23rd day of
April, 1962. Paragraph No. 3 of the decree provided
as follows: "Defendant is hereby ordered to pay
plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month for each of
said minor children; for their support and maintenance; * * * Baid payments to commen·ce as of the
23rd day of March, 1962, * * *." ( R. 4'2-44.)
Mter defendant discovered the contents of
plaintiff's diary and shorthand notes, defendant, in
order to obtain an immediate and speedy trial of
the divorce action, moved out of the home pursura.nt
to the stipulation dated January 31, 1962, to the
effect that defendant's so doing would be without
prejudice to his rights. (R. 11-12, 198, 477.) Pursuant to the stipulation defendant agreed to pay
plaintiff the sum of $200.00 for the month of February, 1962, and $200.00 for the month of M·arch,
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1962, pending a decision in the divorce action, which
was set down for trial on March 13, 1962. (R. 18,
621.) Defendant expressly conditioned payment of
the $'200.00 on plaintiff's signing and returning
the stipulation to defendant as set forth on the receipt dated February 2, 1962, for payment of the
first $200.00. (Ex. D-A1.) The admitted facts are
that, pursuant to the stipulation and the decree of
divorce 1 defendant had made the following payments
to plaintiff since defendant moved out of the home
of the parties: $'200.00 on February 2, 1962, for
the month of February as evidenced by the receipt
dated Felbruary 2, 1962; $200.00 on March 1, 1962,
for the month of March as evidenced by the receipts
dated March 1, 196'2; $'200 on May 2, 1962, for the
month of April as evidenced by the check and receipt dated May 2, 1962; $200.00 on M~ay 28, 1962,
for the month of May as evidenced by the check
dated May 28, 196'2; and, $200.00 on June 29, 1962,
for the month of June as evidenced by the receipt
dated June 29, 1962. (Ex. D-A1, R. 621-623.)
The hearing before Judge Snow was held on
July 9, 1962. Defendant was not in default, n1uch
less in contempt of court, for failure to pay support
money.
Plaintiff, in her brief on appeal from the order
of Judge Snow, at page 10, asserts that defendant
is not entitled to credit for any payments of sup20
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port money made prior to en try of the decree of
divorce. The decree of divorce was entered on the
23rd day of April, 1962, and provided for p'ayment
of $200.00 per month commencing as of the 23rd
day of March, 1962. The decree was entered after
the month of March had expired. Defendant had
already paid $200.00 for the month of March. The
effect of pl'aintiff's assertion is that, since defendant
cannot have credit for any payments made prior to
entry of ~he decree and since the month of March
had already expired at the time of entry of the decree, and the decree expressly required payment of
$200.00 for the month of March; therefore, defendant must go back again after April 23rd and pay
twice, or a total of $400.00 for the month of March,
in which month he had already paid $200.00. This
assertion is typical of the attitude displayed by the
plaintiff throughout the marriage, during this litigation, and subsequent to the entry of the decree of
divorce.
Furthermore, if we were to assume that plaintiff's assertion is correct to the effect that defendant
is only entitled to credit for payments made subsequent to entry of the decree of divorce, defendant
was nevertheless not delinquent in payment of support money at the time of the hearing before Judge
Snow on July 9th. Subsequent to the decree of divorce defendant paid plaintiff $200.00 on May 2,
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19'6'2, $200.00 on May 28, 1962, and $200.00 on
June 29, 19'62, as evidenced by Exhibit D-A1. The
decree of divorce entered on April 23, 1962, provided that defendant pay plaintiff $200.00 per month
support money commencing as of the ~3rd day of
March, 1962. The $200.00 payment made on May
2nd may be credited for the monthly period from
the 23rd day of March, 1962, to the 23rd day of
April, 1962. The $200.00 payment made on May
28th may be credited for the monthly period from
the 23rd day of April, 1962, to the 23rd day of May,
1962. The $200.00 payment made on June 29th may
be credited for the monthly period from May 23,
1H62, to June 23, 1962. At the time of the hearing
before Judge Snow on July 9, 1962, defendant had
until July 2'3, 19'62, in which to make the payment
of $200.00 per month for the period from June 23,
to July 2'3, 196~2.
It should be noted at this time th,at the fact
that the defendant agreed to pay plaintiff the sum
of $200.00 per month for the months of February
and MarCh of 1962, prior to the trial of the divorce
action, is not to be construed by this court as an
admission by defen:dant that the award by the trial
court in the decree of divorce of the sum of $200.00
per month support money to plaintiff is reasonable
and not excessive. Defendant agreed to pay plaintiff
$200.00 per month for the months of February and
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March of 1962 prior to trial of the divorce action
pursuant to the stipulation dated January 31, 1962,
in order to obtain an immediate and speedy trial in
which defendant sought immediate custody of his
children, and the stipulation expressly provided that
it should be without prejudice to the rights of the
defen~dant.

The irresponsibility ·and dishonesty with which
plaintiff attempts to force defendant to pay her
$200.00 twice for the month of March, 1962, or a
total of $400.00 for that month, is patent in the
face of illle decree of divorce entered by Ju'dge Jeppson, which effeetively took from defendant his children and all of his property and left defendant with
$56.92 per month upon which to live ~before payment of rent and federal and state income taxes.
(See, defendant's brief on appeal from the decree
of divorce entered by Judge Jeppson, pages 4'7-49.)
This irresponsibility is further demonstrated by the
fact that there appears on the check dated May 2,
1962, in the amount of $200.00, payable to the plaintiff, after the signature of H·oward Kirtley McBroom, the words "McGoo vs. Magoo" in pen and
handwriting identical to that of the endorsement
by Monna McBroom on the reverse side of the check.
(Ex. D~A1.) This is a serious matter. It is one more
example of the irresponsibility and unfitness of
plaintiff demonstrated throughout the entire record.
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POINT 2.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO SET UP VISITATION RIGHTS FOR T'HE DEFENDANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH P'LAINTIFF'S
ANSWER AND COUNTERPETITION.

Judge Snow in his order granted the defendant
the right to have the children visit with him every
other week-end from Friday at 3:00 o'clock P.M. to
Sunday 'at 7:30 o'clock P.M. and on the alternate
week-ends from 9:00 o'clock A.M. to 7:30 o'clock
P.M. on Saturday. (R. 82-84.)
Plaintiff in her counterpetition before Judge
Snow sought to limit defendant's rights of visitation to one day every other week from 6:00 o'clock
P.M. on Friday until 6:00 o'clock P.M. on Saturday
and one-half a day on the alternate weeks from 1:00
o'clock P.M. to 7:30 o'clock P.M. on Sunday afternoons. (R. 98-101.)
Plaintiff argues that it was unfair for Judge
Marcellus K. Snow to substitute the court's judgment for plaintiff's judgment with respect to defendant's rights of visitation with his children pending this appeal. (See, plaintiff's brief on appeal
from the order of Judge Snow, p. 13.) This assertion invloves an error on a basic assumption, to-wit,
that plaintiff is competent to formulate a ju:dgment
as to what is in the best interest of the children in
any respect including their relationships with their
father. The record as to what has happened since
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the trial of the divorce action demonstrates that
she is not. See, Statement of Facts, s~tpra. p 1,
et seq.
Plaintiff asserts that the effect of Judge Snow's
order is that she only has the children on Sunday
every other week-end. (Plaintiff's brief on appeal
from the order of Judge Snow, p. 7.) The effect of
Judge Snow's order is that the defendant has the
children with him only two days of every other
week and one day during the daytime on the alternate weeks, or a total of six days a month.
Plaintiff asserts that defendant should be prohibited from having the children on ~any full Sunday
so that she will be able to attend to their religious
activities. (Plaintiff's brief on. appeal from the
order of Judge Snow, pp. 4 & 12.) This assertion
is incomprehensible in the light of the record of
plaintiff's conduct during the marriage ~and from
the time of trial of the divorce action down to the
date of the hearing before Judge Snow, s~tpra.
p. 13, et seq.
Plaintiff asserts that, since J u d g e Jeppson
awarded her custody of the children, she is a fit
and proper person to have their custody; and, therefore, Judge Snow erred in refusing to adopt her
notions as to what is in the best interest of the
children with respect to their visitation "\Vi th their
father. (Plaintiff's brief on appeal from the order
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of Judge Snow, p. 12.) This assertion involves an
error on the basic assumption, to-wit, that plaintiff
is a fit and proper person to have the care and custody of the children. The admitted facts !at the trial
of the divorce action and the admitted facts at the
hearing before Judge Snow demonstrate conclusively
that she is not. See, Statements of Facts, supra.
p. 1, et seq., ,and defendant's brief on appeal from
the decree of divorce in which defendant is seeking
custody of the children at this time, pp. 2-33, 39-47.
Furthermore, this assertion involves an erroneous
conclusion that plaintiff is capable of determining
what is in the best interest of the children including their relationship with their father, in the face
of the uncontroverted evidence that since the tri'al
of the divorce action she has ( 1) repeatedly and
persistently denied defendant visitation, (2) refused
to permit defendant to see the children at all over
extended periods, ( 3) used the children in efforts
to extort money from the defendant, ( 4) left the
children continually with baby tenders and at times
unprotected and un·attended, ( 5) punished the children for visiting with their father, (6) attempted to
degrade the father in the eyes of his children and
(7) alienate their affection for him, (8) repeatedly
visited obscenity and moral depravity tlpon the children, and, ( 9) visited cruelty upon the children,
supra. p. 4, et seq.
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It must be noted at this time th,at defendant,
pending this appeal, was forced to resort to the
court to protect his children with respect to their visitation with their father. 'The fact that defendant
at this time is taking a position in defense of Judge
Snow's order protecting the matter of visitation
must not be construed by this court as a concession
in 'aDY sense on the part of defendant that plaintiff
should be awarded custody of the children or that
she is a fit an·d proper person to have their custody
and control. The admitted facts at the trial of the
divorce action and the uncontroverted and admitted
facts ~as to her conduct subsequent to trial of the
divorce acti·on 'demonstrate conclusively that she
is not and that it is in the best interest of the children
that custody be awarded to the defendant.
See Stuber v. Stuber (1952) 121 U. 632, 244
P. 2d 650, in which the court awarded custody of
the child to the wife because the evidence showed
that, while the child was living with the hus'band,
the husband, his mother and his second Wife were
working and the child was required to spend extended periods of time with baby tenders; and, the
evidence on behalf of the wife showed that the wife
was living with her n1other, the maternal grandmother was not working and the maternal grandlnother and the wife were prepared to offer the personal care of a blood relative for the child at all
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times. See, also, Johnson v. Johnson (1958) 7 U.
2d 263, 323 P. 2d 16, in which the court awarded
custody of the eight year old child to the father
where the evidence showed that the mother was living alone and working because it was in the best
interest of the child.
POINT 3.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO RESTRAIN DEFENDANT FROM INTERFERING WITH PLAINTIFF ON PLAINTIFF'S JOB, ·OR
HARRASSING THE PLAINTIFF AT HOME OR AT
w·o,RK, ON THE TE'LE'PHONE, OR IN ANY OTHER
MANNER, AND IN REFUSING TO RESTRAIN DEFENDANT 'FROl\1: THREATENING PLAINTIFF VVITH
BODILY HARM.

Pltaintiff complains in her appeal from the
order of Judge Snow that the court failed to restrain defendant from interfering with plaintiff's
job, or harrassing plaintiff at home or at work, on
the telep·hone, or in 'any other manner, and from
threatening plaintiff with bodily harn1. (See plainltiff's brief on appeal from the order of Judge Snow,
pp. 2 & 13.) Plaintiff, in her counter-petition before Judge Snow, did not seek such restraining order
and merely sought an order restraining defendant,
''from coming on the home premises at any time
except to exercise his rights of visitation with the
minor children as specifically set by the court."
(R. 100-101.) The uncontroverted evidence at the
hearing was that defendant had not gone upon the
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pre1nises of the parties since the divorce action
except for the purpose of carrying the children up
to the door and leaving them after visitation. (R.
614-616.) On one such occasion defendant did speak
to the plaintiff and asked her if he could h~ave his
personal effects. Plaintiff replied by thumbing her
nose at defendant in the presence of the children.
(R. 615.) Thlis evidence was uncontroverted. Defendant testified that he had never threatened to
beat plaintiff and that he had not touc:hed her. (R.
6'20, 616.) This evidence was uncontroverted. Defendant admitted on the witness stand that he 'told
plaintiff he would use force, if necessary, to prevent her from taking the children out of the state
so that he would never see them again, which plraintiff had threatened to do if defendant continued to
prosecute this appeal or the action against J'arvis.
(R. 592- 593, 614, 616.) Defendant further testified that he told the plaintiff that eventually he
would not permit plaintiff to raise the children and
that what he meant was that he had faith in the
law. Plaintiff thereupon goaded him ,and said, ''y·ou
mean law or no law, you're not going to let me raise
the children?" The defendant then replied, "I am
going to take those children. I can't permit this.''
( R. 617. ) What man could say otherwise in the face
of the uncontroverted and admitted facts before
this court of visitation of cruelty, neglect and moral
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depravity upon his children? Judge Snow specifically found that the defendant had not gone on the
premises except for the purpose of ·delivering the
children after visitation ·and that defendant had
not abused or molested plaintiff. ( R. 79.)
Plaintiff, in her brief on appeal from the order
of Judge Snow at page 7, infers that she lost a job
since the divorce action at Kennecott Copper Corporation because defendant harrassed her at work
and expressed concern about disclosing where she
was presently employed. There is absolutely no evidence in the record that plaintiff did lose her job
because of any action on the part of defendant or
that defendant harrassed her at work. Plaintiff's
counsel expressly stated to the court that he was not
representing that defendant's actions had anything
to do with plaintiff's losing her job. (R. 662.) 'The
only evidence in the record that defendant ever contacted plaintiff at work was a general assertion by
plaintiff that defendant called her on the telephone,
without any staten1ent of the number, time, or nature of the calls. ( R. 664.) AI though there is no
evidence in the record on the matter, we concede
that defendant did telephone plaintiff at work on a
few occasions and then only for the purpose of attempting to determine the whereabouts of his children and arranging to see them.
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POINT 4.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RESTRAINING PLAINTIFF FROM TAKING THE CHILDREN
OUT OF THE STATE OF UTAH OR IN ANY MANNER CAUSING THE CHILDREN TO BE REMOVED
FROM THE STATE OF UTAH.

Judge Snow in his order restrained plaintiff
from taking the children out of the State of Utah or
from in any manner causing the children to be
removed from the State of Utah for a period in excess of thirty days without express permission of
the court, first had and obtained, upon notice to
defendant an·d a hearing thereon. Plaintiff concedes
in her brief on 'appeal from the order of Judge Snow
that the court did not err in issuing this restraining
order against plaintiff. See, Plaintiff's brief on
appeal from the order of Judge Snow at Page 15
wherein plaintiff says, ''The plaintiff does not quarrell with the proposition as cited by this court and~
universally accepted to the effect that the court
should m·ain tain control of the minor children of the
parties and m·aintain said children within the jurisdiction of the court." Plaintiff, having conceded
that Judge Snow did not err in restraining the plaintiff from taking the children out of the state and
keeping the children subject to the jurisdiction of
the court, we are not required to answer Point 4
of the plaintiff's brief so far as it pertains to the
issuance of the restraining order. Plaintiff, undel~
Point 4 of her brief on appeal from the order of
~1
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Judge Snow, after conceding that issuance of the
restraining order was not error, proceeds again to
con1plain because Judge Snow did not issue an order
restraining defendant from harrassing plaintiff and
threatening to do her physical harm. (See, Plaintiff's
brief on 'appeal from the order of Judge Snow, pp.
14-15.) We have already answered this latter contention under Point 3 of this brief, sttpra, p. 28,
et seq. The evidence at the hearing before Judge
Snow was conclusive that defendant has not touched
plaintiff since prior to the trial of the divorce action
and tha:t defendant has not threatened plaintiff
with physical harm or abused her. Based on this
evidence Judge Snow expressly found that the defendant 'h'a.d not done so, St[pra, p. 28, et seq.
P01NT 5.
THE TRIAL CO'URT ERRED IN AWARDING
PLAINTIFF $125.00 ATTORNEYS FEES IN CONNECTI·ON WITH THE HEARING BEFORE JUDGE SNOW.

Defendant cross appeals from that part of the
order of Judge Snow in which Judge Snow awarded
plaintiff $125.00 attorneys fees in connection with
the hearing. (See defendant's statement of points
by way of cross appeal, R. 89.)
The uncontroverted evidence at the hearing
before Judge Snow and the findings of Judge Snow
(R. 78-79) show that, pending defendant's appeal
to this court from a decree of divorce, defendant was
forced to resort to the tri,al court as a result of
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

teet his children and his rights of visitation under
circumstances in which plaintiff was denying defendant his rights of visitation, refusing to permit
the children to see their father over extended periods,
using the cildren and denying defendant his rights
of visitation in efforts to extort money from defendant, visiting cruelty upon the children for visiting their father, and visiting moral depra:vity upon
them. The effect of awarding plaintiff attorneys
fees against defendant in connection with this hearing is to penalize defendant for resorting to the
courts to protect his children. In view of his findings Judge Snow could only have been prompted
to award plaintiff attorneys fees in connection with
this hearing from a mistaken notion that, every time
a woman comes into court in connection with a divorce action, she is entitled to attorneys fees regardless of the circumstances of the parties and regardless of the fact that her own wrongdoing brought
the parties into court. It should be pointed out that
this litigation has been very costly for defendant
and that his every effort from the date of filing of
the complaint by plaintiff down to the present time
has been for the protection of his children.
The italics are by the writer.
Respectfully submitted,
McBROO·M & HYDE
401 El Paso Natural Gas Building
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant
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